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This study provides first comprehensive analyses of foreign-controlled enterprises in the 
German service sector based on new micro data from official statistics. Various performance 
measures were examined by comparing unconditional and conditional means and quantile 
regression techniques were applied. Results reveal persistently superior performance for 
foreign-controlled affiliates  when  compared to German-owned  affiliates.  In  contrast,  the 
relationship for profitability is exactly the opposite. Labor productivity becomes insignificant 
when the comparison group consists of domestically-owned affiliates with a high degree of 
internationalization. A breakdown by country of origin shows that European affiliates pay 
lower  wages  and  export  less  compared  to  other  foreign  affiliates  and  that  there  is  no 
productivity advantage in favor of US firms like in manufacturing. 
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1.   Motivation 
Due  to  their  influencial  role  in  economic  globalization,  multinational  enterprises  (MNEs) 
attract substantial academic and public interest. Moreover, MNEs and their affiliates are of 
increasing importance in international division of labor (Birkinshaw 2001). Although foreign-
owned enterprises amount to approximately one percent of all German enterprises of the 
non-financial economy, they generate a disproportionate economic impact (see Figure 1). 
Fears of downsizing (SVR 2007: 388), potentially exaggerated by unbalanced media coverage 
(see Friebel and Heinz 2011), may accompany expansion or takeovers by foreign firms. Thus, 
governments engage in strategically-motivated efforts to restrict foreign ownership, which 
in Germany are mostly limited to foreign wealth funds. On the other hand, treatment of 
foreign-owned  firms  in  economic  policy  is  driven  by  assumptions  on  direct  or  indirect 
positive  economic  impacts  on  the  aggregate  economy,  for  example  through  positive 
externalities (e.g., Görg and Greenaway 2004 and Smeets 2008). 
  Do foreign-owned firms enjoy a superior or suffer an inferior relative performance 
compared  to  their  German  counterparts?
2  Or  is  there  no  significant  difference?  Existing 
empirical  research  has  not  yet  established  a  conclusive  answer.  International  studies 
produce rather ambiguous results, and, for Germany in particular, evidence is insufficient for 
assuming stylized facts. Furthermore, there is a dearth of evidence for the German service 
sector,
3 even though it accounted for 73 percent of gross domestic product in Germany in 
2009  (World  Bank  2011)  and  is  characterized  by  a  foreign  presence  that  is  as  equally 
impactful as that in the manufacturing sector (Figure 1). The importance of the tertiary 
sector  in  general  has  experienced  a  remarkable  appreciation  during  the  last  decades 
worldwide (see Nissan et al. 2011 for details) and is still much less subject to empirical 
economic analysis than manufacturing. Limitations of data and a more difficult tracking of 
the produced intangible output are two reasons (ibid.: 66). In particular, internationalization 
aspects of service industries, such as FDI and trade, suffer a lack of investigation, although 
they became an explicit part of the agenda for international trade negotiations (Raff and 
Ruhr  2007:  299).  The  mode  of  FDI,  among  other  internationalization  strategies,  is 
                                                           
2  The  terms  foreign-owned  and  foreign-controlled  are  used  interchangeably  here  and  refer  to  majority 
ownership of more than 50 percent. The use of the term performance refers to a relatively general concept of 
the  operation  characteristics  of  firms  and,  therefore,  goes  beyond  ratios  of  profitability  and  productivity, 
including also measures like wage payments and export behavior. 
3 An exemption is Temouri et al. (2008). 3 
 
acknowledged  to  be  much  more  important  for  services  firms  than  for  those  from 
manufacturing (e.g., UNCTC 1989: 92),
4 what places increased emphasis on the investigation 
of foreign affiliates in services.  
  This  study  puts  forth  the  first  empirical  analysis  of  foreign-controlled  enterprise 
performance in the German service sector, based on new micro data of official statistics with 
information  from the EU-wide  Foreign  Affiliates  Statistics  (FATS)  that have  only  recently 
become available for the years 2007 and 2008. Apart from labor productivity, paid wages 
and size, export behavior and profitability are examined, which are neglected in the context 
of foreign ownership to date. Taking heterogeneity issues into account, inter alia quantile 
regressions are applied and a breakdown by country of origin is performed. Additionally, 
differences  between  foreign-controlled  exporters  and  non-exporters  are  studied. 
Unfortunately, the analysis remains restricted to cross-sectional data and therefore suffers 
from associated disadvantages, such as the inability to establish causal relationships and 
account for unobserved  heterogeneity.  Prior  to  empirical  analysis,  this  paper  provides  a 
detailed  theoretical  differentiation  of  potential  causal  effects  that  can  be  covered  by  a 
dichotomous foreign ownership variable, to generally legitimize the application of such an 
explanatory variable, even if causality is in focus. 
 
Section  2  discusses  the  theoretical  underpinnings  of  the  empirical  analysis  in  published 
literature. Section 3 reviews previous empirical work with emphasis on German datasets, 
while Section 4 presents the database and definition of variables used in this analysis of the 
German  service  sector. The  results  are  reported  and discussed  in the sub-sections  of  5. 
Section 6 concludes. 
 






                                                           
4 Reasons are for example “the intangibility and perishability of many services” that cause high cross-border 
transaction costs (UNCTC 1989: 92) and the general difficulty of specifying the transfer of knowledge which can 
be of high relevancy for licensing strategies in knowledge intensive services (Raff and Ruhr 2007: 303). 4 
 
2.   Theoretical considerations 
Despite  the  prevalence  of  inductive  logic  in  the  empirical  research  practice,  theoretical 
considerations  are  of  fundamental  importance  to  develop  a  symbiotic  relation  between 
theory and empiricism. Theory should put possible explanations regarding a performance 
gap between foreign and domestically-owned firms. Unfortunately, the theory underlying a 
possible  causal  relationship  between  firm  performance  and  foreign  ownership  remains 
fragmented.  Although  the  following  considerations  stem  mainly  from  manufacturing 
contexts, they are generally applicable to services, too. Nevertheless, one should keep in 
mind major differences between the two sectors, for example regarding intangible asset and 
labor intensity (see Tanaka 2011: 12 for evidence on MNEs), that can affect the particular 
weight of a certain reasoning. On the other hand, a clear-cut distinction of both producing 
activities  is  sometimes  not  possible.  For  instance,  due  to  the  intermediary  character  of 
producer  services  for  manufactured  goods,  there  are  “blurring  boundaries  between 
manufacturing and services” (Solé Parellada et al. 2011: 2). 
 
2.1   Comparative advantages of MNE affiliates and strategic patterns 
The most frequently-mentioned explanation argues for a superior performance of foreign-
owned firms in almost all fields and can be labeled the “specific advantage hypothesis” 
(Bellak 2004: 486). The theory dates back to seminal work by Dunning (1988) and Caves 
(1974  and  1996:  162-180)  and  was  developed  in  an  attempt  to  explain  the  origin  of 
internalized international firm activities through foreign direct investment (FDI). According 
to Dunning’s prominent OLI-paradigm, a firm-specific ownership advantage is a necessary 
precondition for domestic firms to become a MNE. This advantage can either be tangible or 
intangible  (like  advanced  technology  or  organizational  superiority)  and  is  available  to 
affiliates within the MNE network at low marginal costs due to its public good character. 
Thus, foreign-owned firms, which participate in a multinational network, are endowed with a 
“genuine” comparative advantage over their domestic counterparts which are not part of an 
MNE. However, there is another possibility for MNEs to attain a firm-specific advantage, the 
neglect of which constitutes the primary criticism of Dunning’s paradigm (e.g., Casson 1987: 
33). Comparative advantages can emerge after a business becomes multinational due to the 
fact  of  being  multinational  per  se  or  being  geographically  diversified,  respectively.  For 5 
 
instance, benefits can result from better access to markets and resources in a material and 
immaterial sense, as well as from overall flexibility to shift activities or profits across borders 
(see Bellak 2004: 487f. for a more comprehensive compilation). Opportunities for Relocation 
are  especially  true  for  services  firms,  as  they  generally  have  lower  exit  and  entry  costs 
(Nguyen et al. 2004: 274) and are less dependent on external finance (Borchert and Mattoo 
2009: 3). Not all so-called network advantages require multinationality, however since a 
nationally-restricted  network  of  entities  could  achieve  benefits  of  the  same  type,  even 
though to a smaller extent.
5 Nevertheless, in the context of this work, this theory offers a 
theoretical  explanation  for  why  foreign  MNE  subsidiaries  could  exhibit  performance 
advantages over domestically oriented firms, whether they result from a priori advantages 
of MNEs or network effects. 
Since a MNE consists of various sub-entities, each entity can play a different role 
within the network and follow individual strategic patterns. Assuming that affiliates aim to 
source technology or knowledge or operate as an export platform, specific advantages of the 
parent  -  for  instance,  a  more  efficient  production  technique  -  must  not  inevitably  be 
transferred to the affiliate. The same applies for acquisitions of competitors for reasons of 
market  power  or  the  acquisition  of  poor  performing  “lemons”  with  the  purpose  of 
enhancing firm value in the future. In general “[s]ourcing strategies of business firms have 
become  more  complex  than  ever  before,  and  so  have  the  integration  strategies  of 
multinational  corporations”  (Helpman  2006:  590).  It  becomes  apparent  here  that  the 
comparative performance of MNE subsidiaries depends heavily on the type of activity and 
that the unit of analysis can play a major role for theoretical assumptions as well as empirical 
results, whether it be headquarter or affiliate, enterprise or establishment. 
From  the  above  discussion,  one  can  conclude  that  the  presented  considerations 
solely  cover  participants  of  multinational  networks  and  ignore  cases  in  which  firms  are 
foreign-controlled but not part of a company network. Furthermore, the discussion only 
applies  to  comparison  between  foreign-owned  firms  and  domestically-owned  non-
multinationals.  Even  if  all  units  in  a  considered  population  were  foreign-owned 
multinationals or domestically-owned non-multinationals, assumptions based on the idea of 
                                                           
5 E.g., Frenz and Ietto-Gillies (2007) distinguish between national and international networks and find a higher 
probability for UK firms to be innovative in the latter case, while the former range between firms without any 
network and those with an international one. 6 
 
comparative advantage are not as clear-cut as is often implied in the literature due to the 
heterogeneous roles and strategies of MNE affiliates. 
 
2.2   Country-of-origin effects 
Apart  from  the  aforementioned  explanation  for  a  performance  gap,  a  second,  well-
represented line of argument has been described that refers to the owner’s identity in terms 
of nationality. Contrary to the perception of multinationals as “footloose” or “stateless” that 
lost any imprint of their national origin in the convergence process of economic and cultural 
globalization,  stands  the  vast  consensus  that  “[t]he  notion  of  the  global  corporation 
transcending  national  boundaries  is,  very  largely,  myth”  (Ferner  1997:  19).
6  Following 
empirical evidence, various researchers assume that an MNE´s home country influences firm 
performance in the fields of human resource management and industrial relations, but also 
on productivity measures.
7 Outcome differences in firm performance are traced back to 
variations in the institutional arrangement of the national business systems, such as labor 
market regulations (Whitley 1992), overall cultural differences that manifest themselves in 
the respective firm´s corporate governance structure (Hofstede 1992), and different factor 
endowments. However, a sharp separation of these mechanisms from one another seems 
certainly unfeasible. Therefore, MNEs should be perceived as a “two-way vector of dynamic 
change  within  national  business  systems  –  both  bringing  to  host  countries  their  own 
nationally distinctive ways of doing things, and taking from the host environment lessons for 
adoption at home” (Ferner et al. 2001: 124).
8 
One can emphasize that theoretical considerations assuming country-of-origin effects 
are likewise not suitable for implying a universal and intrinsic impact of foreign ownership 
across countries. This is because particular attributes of firms, traced back to the country of 
origin, do not vary among national borders in absolute terms and are therefore much more 
consistent than the characteristic of being foreign-controlled. Although such considerations 
are more conceivable in the context of MNE affiliates rather than with foreign-owned firms, 
                                                           
6 For a more comprehensive discussion of this debate see Woodward and Nigh (1998). 
7 For example Wächter et al. (2003) investigate US affiliates in Germany and find  significant variations in 
patterns of human resource management due to a “competitive managerial capitalism” typically observed in 
the US business system as such, and Ferner et al. (2001) attest a considerable magnitude of “Germanness” for 
German MNE subsidiaries in Britain and Spain. Bloom and Van Reenen (2010) just as Bloom et al. (2011) 
provide evidence for an impact on productivity measures, among others. 
8 A concrete example of „forward and reverse diffusion“ in management practices is given in a case study by 
Hayden and Edwards (2001). 7 
 
the influence of something like a “national culture” or business culture on firm performance 
could be extended to the latter as well. However, the general direction of potential country-
of-origin effects is not obvious and should be varying. 
 
2.3   Foreignness 
One more major line of argument can be identified in the literature of international firm 
activity and appears to be the only one that bears the ability of explaining a causal effect of 
foreign ownership per se. It is thus astonishing that these considerations have, to the best of 
the  author´s  knowledge,  never  been  explicitly  set  out  separately  in  the  context  of  a 
comparative performance of foreign-controlled firms. The term “foreign-owned” does not 
primarily imply that the owner is of a special nationality, but that the owner is not of the 
nationality of the economy in consideration and therefore a stranger. In other words, the 
feature referred to in this case is first and foremost her or his foreignness, and not being of a 
specific  nationality.  Theoretical  considerations  generally  point  out  the  “liability  of 
foreignness” (Daamen et al. 2007), which can be induced through extra costs required to 
overcome  various  obstacles,  such  as  communication  issues  (spatial  distance,  different 
languages  and  intercultural  mistrust)  and  transport  (Buckley  2000:  294),  as  well  as  the 
additional effort in monitoring work processes and searching for appropriate employees 
resulting from information deficits in foreign markets (Feliciano and Lipsey 2006: 75). The 
fact of being a stranger in foreign markets can have specific severity for services firms as 
these sell mostly customized and non-standardized products that demand for more intense 
communication  with  customers  (e.g.,  Eickelpasch  and  Vogel  2011:  513).  Furthermore,  a 
broad range of services are so-called experience goods that can be subject to moral hazard. 
Therefore, customers tend to prefer services whose quality is not in question, and, hence, 
may create a disadvantage for foreign suppliers (Raff and Ruhr 2007: 301f.). 
Strictly speaking, the additional costs of foreignness are already incorporated in the 
idea  of  specific  comparative  advantages  and  the  corresponding  assumption  that  the 
advantages  outweigh  the  disadvantages  (Buckley  2000:  300).  However,  foreignness  may 
merit separation of this assumption to demonstrate that a foreign ownership variable can 
indeed capture more than just a residual of “status-specific parameters influencing a firm´s 
[…] performance that cannot be specified otherwise“ (Günther and Gebhardt 2005: 96) as it 
is supposed to be the fact at times in the literature. Certainly, a proper method of measuring 8 
 
and isolating this effect is far from easy since learning effects over time may add a dynamic 
dimension. 
 
2.4   Specific measures of performance 
While the outlined arguments thus far apply to productivity measures in principle - which is 
surely the aspect of performance that has received the most attention - other figures need 
some  supplemental  remarks  although  productivity  can  have  a  basic  influence  on  other 
measures itself. 
 
Profitability reflects comparative advantages that are not inherently included in productivity. 
The two normally go hand in hand, since relative productivity advantages or disadvantages 
should mirror a direct impact on profitability in the same direction. However, this is not 
necessarily the case if accounting policy criteria are taken into consideration. For example, 
MNEs  could  shift  profits  from  high-  to  low-tax  countries  through  the  manipulation  of 
transfer prices to reduce their tax burden. Indeed, beyond anecdotal evidence, Dischinger 
and Riedel (2008) provide empirical evidence for the bias of intangible assets within MNE 
affiliates  towards  low-tax  affiliates,  what  can  be  assessed  as  a  hint  for  profit-shifting 
activities, or, at least, as facilitation of the latter. Thus, a potential dependence of measured 
profitability on the affiliates´ tax environment is revealed.
9  
 
Wages paid by foreign-owned firms are often expected to be higher on average, compared 
to  those  of  domestically-owned  firms,  resulting  from  distributing  higher  profits  through 
bargaining (Girma et al. 2002: 94), prevention of job turnover (Sjöholm and Lipsey 2006: 
203), or compensation for disadvantages on the labor market (Feliciano and Lipsey 2006: 
75). Here, again, most considerations point to multinationality status rather than foreign 
ownership as the main causal factor. Unfortunately, this study remains highly descriptive 
regarding a wage gap, because data used neither allows to control for different skill levels 
nor for actual hours of work what makes it impossible to draw any reliable conclusions on 
the paid price for the labor factor, independent of its quality (see inter alia Almeida 2007 on 
this). 
                                                           
9 Nevertheless, profit shifting is capable of causing a “bias” in measured productivity as well (see Maffini and 
Mokkas 2011). 9 
 
 
The classical idea of a vertically-integrated MNE includes a sufficient explanation for trade 
between affiliates and their parent. Beyond that, in practice, subsidiaries export to third-
party countries as well (export platforms) and only recently some steps evolved to deal with 
the  question,  how  this  behavior  can  be  absorbed  by  theory.
10  Far  from  comprehensive 
theory, some simple considerations give rise to a higher probability of being an exporter for 
foreign-controlled firms: For example, these firms could be bound into a cross-border value 
creation chain as part of a multinational network by definition. Or, a critical level of fixed 
costs of exporting (Cole et al. 2010: 267, among others) itself might facilitate the export-
decision in favor of firms with productivity advantage anyway, which in turn might be MNE 
network participants. Finally, it seems plausible to impute foreign-owned firms (and not only 
MNEs) an average information advantage regarding foreign markets because of the existing 
ties with at least one foreign country. 
Finally, after this outline of theoretical considerations it should be maintained as a matter of 
fact  that  even  theoretical  pre-considerations  by  no  means  end  up  in  straightforward 
assumptions whether there should be a performance gap due to foreign ownership or there 
should be none, or if an existing gap should be in favor or to the disadvantage of foreign-
owned firms (see Table 1).  
 
[Table 1 about here] 
 
Moreover, it should not be astonishing if a non-ambiguous effect of foreign ownership per 
se  cannot  be  identified  in  empirical  research  since  already  according  to  theoretical  pre-
considerations  it  is  primarily  multinationality  (as  a  special  case  of  network  effects)  that 
seems to affect performance. On the other hand, one should not rule out the possibility of a 





                                                           
10 Ekholm, Forslid and Markusen (2007) just as Lu, Lu and Tao (2010) develop trade-models which include a 
third country and therefore can help to understand the strategic motivation of the so called export platforms.  10 
 
3.   Previous empirical research 
International studies on comparative performance of foreign-owned firms exhibit ambiguous 
results, although tendencies of a methodological dependence can be disentangled. In cases 
where data allows for holding some decisive factors constant beyond the standard constants 
of industry and size (e.g., input heterogeneity or multinationality), performance gaps tend to 
shrink  and  sometimes  even  disappear  (e.g.,  Globerman  et  al.  1994).  Even  if  foreign 
acquisitions  are  taken  as  exogenous  treatments  to  identify  a  causal  effect  of  foreign 
ownership, a remarkable amount of investigations still report statistically significant gaps of 
economically-relevant  magnitude  (for  a  more  detailed  survey  see  Barba  Navaretti  and 
Venables 2004: 155-162, Pfaffermayr and Bellak 2002, Bellak 2004 or Lipsey 2004).
11 Bellak 
(2004:  484)  summarizes  that  “the  relevance  of  foreign  ownership  as  a  determinant  of 
performance gaps is often overstated”. While this is unquestionably the case, it does not 
imply redundancy from an econometric nor from a theoretical perspective. 
  The majority of international studies refer to manufacturing and still relatively little is 
known about foreign-owned firms in services. Two exceptions were performed with UK data: 
analysis  of  the  entire  non-manufacturing  sector  by  Oulton  (1998)  and  the  explicit 
investigation  of  the  service  sector  by  Griffith  et  al.  (2004).  Both  find  considerable 
productivity advantages for foreign companies and establishments, even if foreign-owned 
firms are compared to domestic multinationals. While Oulton (1998) observes a larger gap 
than  in  manufacturing,  Griffith  et  al.  (2004)  finds  a  smaller  difference  and  additional 
evidence  for  selection  effects  through  foreign  takeovers  instead  of  productivity 
improvements after ownership change. 
 
The variability in international results for the comparative performance of foreign-owned 
firms  merits  an  increasing  emphasis  on  country-specific  surveys.  Among  empirical  work 
based on German data that go beyond a comparison of means, two strands of performance 
measures  are  targeted:  productivity  and  several  variables  directly  geared  to  the  labor 
market. Borrmann et al. (2003) and Jungnickel and Keller (2003) analyze data of the IAB 
Establishment  Panel  and  obtain  quite  similar  results  of  significant  and  positive  foreign-
                                                           
11 The problem of limited comparability of results across studies is of great extent due to a wide variety of 
applied methods and data quality as well as differing thresholds for “foreign ownership”. The latter ranges 
between 10 and 51 percent of foreign shares. 11 
 
ownership  productivity  premiums  and  insignificant  wage  differences,  when  domestic 
establishments with an export quota of at least thirty percent serve as reference group. 
Mattes  (2010)  applies  a  common  difference-in-difference  approach  combined  with 
propensity score matching to compare foreign takeovers and non-takeovers in the same 
dataset and finds no significant gap for productivity nor for the level of employment.
12 Hijzen 
et al. (2010) follow the same methodological approach but concentrate on wages and other 
working conditions across three skill levels using linked employer employee data from the 
IAB  Establishment  Panel  and  the  employment  statistics  register  (Beschäftigtenstatistik). 
Results point to higher wages in foreign-owned firms in all skill categories in Germany, job 
stability, hours of work and union coverage are not affected by foreign ownership. In this 
analysis the entire universe of domestiacally-owned enterprises is referred to. Andrews et al. 
(2009) also investigate wage differences based on the IAB Establishment Panel and look also 
from the perspective of employees changing their employer, as treatment, and yield a more 
or less significantly positive foreign wage premium. Here again, all German-owned firms 
serve as group of comparison. Arndt and Mattes (2010) restrict their treatment analysis to 
foreign takeovers of domestic MNEs and therefore exclude possible performance differences 
due to multinationality. Nevertheless, productivity is considerably higher in foreign-owned 
firms while employment seems equal. Unlike other mentioned studies, Arndt and Mattes 
use  the  Microdatabase  Direct  Investment  (MiDi)  in  combination  with  balance-sheet 
information provided by the Bureau van Dijk. The sole work treating services separately is 
Temouri et al. (2008), who also use data offered by the Bureau van Dijk. The more detailed 
results demonstrate heterogeneity across industries by reporting productivity advantages of 
foreign majority-owned firms for the overall service sector but not in the high- or low-tech 
service  sectors.  In  the  manufacturing  sector,  foreign  firms  enjoy  significantly  higher 
productivity in high-tech industries, but no advantage in the low-tech manufacturing sector. 
  Although sophisticated empirical analyses exist for German data, some shortcomings 
remain: little work focuses on services separately, certain measures were cancelled out of 
analysis thus far, like export behavior
13 or profitability, and one could further argue that 
German  MNEs  are  not  necessarily  the  proper  reference  group.  Finally,  the  ratio  of 
                                                           
12  However,  he  fails  to  take  general  effects  of  acquisitions  and  the  multinational  status  into  account  and 
includes only two post-acquisition years in his analysis. 
13 An exemption is Arndt et al. (2009: 112f.) where OLS premium regressions are performed with all German-
owned establishments as comparison group. However, evidence regarding export behavior of foreign-owned 
firms is rare to find even internationally. 12 
 
comparability and variation of studies to produce robust stylized facts seems not sufficient 
yet. 
 
4.   Data and variables 
To pursue matters connected with foreign ownership of firms in Germany, to date, three 
sources could be found which provide information on this aspect of ownership structure: the 
Establishment Panel of the Institute for Employment Research of the Federal Labor Services 
(IAB) (Kölling 2000), the FDI micro database of the Central Bank (MiDi) (Lipponer 2003) and 
datasets from the private company Creditreform. Recently, a new database emerged that 
seems capable to overcome some shortcomings of previous statistics and allows extended 
future  research  in  the  field  (Weche  Gelübcke  2011).  According  to  a  regulation  of  the 
European Parliament and the Council of the European Union (No. 716/2007) “a common 
framework  for  the  systematic  production  of  Community  statistics  on  the  structure  and 
activity of foreign affiliates” was developed. The German statistical offices were forced to 
merge information, whether an enterprise is under foreign or domestic majority-ownership, 
received from the already mentioned private vendor, with the official structural business 
statistics database (Unternehmensregister). Apart from feasibility studies, the first reliable 
information was available for the reporting years 2007 and 2008 (Feuerhake et al. 2010 as 
well as 2009 and Schmidt et al. 2009). The analysis was therefore restricted to a cross-
sectional approach. For robustness reasons, both years were analyzed although they are not 
perfectly comparable. For 2008 a new sample was drawn. Furthermore, measures in 2008 
might already be affected by the global economic and financial crisis. 
Whereas  the  Federal  Statistical  Office  delivers  the  produced  statistics  on  inward 
foreign affiliates (IFATS) to Eurostat, new information is available to researchers within the 
framework  of  official  statistics  to  analyze  the  economic  activity  of  FDI-enterprises.  In 
addition to general advantages of official statistics due to a non-exclusive accessibility,
14 
sampling and response matters,
15 a broader pool of characteristics of the statistical units can 
be analyzed which is not tailored specifically to a labor demand (IAB) or monetary (MiDi) 
                                                           
14 For this study, the micro data was analyzed via remote access at the Research Data Centers of the statistical 
offices (FDZ) Berlin-Brandenburg and Lower Saxony because of confidentiality reasons. 
15 “[T]he units covered by the survey are usually obliged to report (and to report the true figures), and the 
survey often is a census covering all units from a well-defined population. Therefore, data from official statistics 
are high quality data.” (Wagner 2010a: 134) 13 
 
perspective. Furthermore, the reporting unit is the enterprise rather than the establishment, 
which may help to reduce a bias due to heterogeneous roles of parts of an enterprise and 
can be seen as the appropriate unit of analysis in this context.
16 
  In particular, the following analysis is founded on the structural survey in the service 
sector  (SiD),  which  is  a  questionnaire-based  stratified  random  sample  that  covers 
approximately 15 percent of enterprises from the service sector with at least 17,500 EUR 
turnover, according to the German classification WZ2003 (section I and K).
17 For the analysis 
of firm performance, common variables are calculated whose summary statistics are shown 
in Table 2. Labor productivity and the return on sales are considered as well-established 
measures  of  efficiency  and  represent  firm  performance  in  a  stricter  sense.  The  former 
calculated  as  gross  value  added  at factor  costs  per  capita
18  and  the  latter  as  a  ratio  of 
operating profit and total turnover. Further variables of interest are the export intensity, 
defined  as  the  ratio  of  turnover  generated  abroad  and  revenue  from  self-employed 
activities,  and  annual  gross  wage  per  capita.  Firm  size  is  defined  by  the  number  of 
employees.
19 
To generate the final analytical sample, both observations with missing values and 
the upper (99
th) and lower (1
rst) percentile of labor productivity and return on sales are 
dropped.
20 Additionally, cases were restricted to enterprises from section K (real estate, 
renting  and  business  activities)  with  at  least  one  employee  subject  to  social  security 
payments. Reporting units with turnover less than 250,000 EUR must be excluded because 
                                                           
16 Certainly, this can hardly be more than a step in the right direction since the object of interest, the foreign-
owned enterprise, in turn might itself part of a multinational network and different activities can be spread 
across its affiliates on an upper hierarchical level again (for a discussion of the appropriate unit of analysis see 
Pfaffermayr and Bellak 2002: 31f.). 
17 For a detailed description of this survey see Federal Statistical Office (2008), for the reporting year 2007 and 
Vogel (2009). 
18 While this relatively simple measure of productivity does not account for capital intensity, like total factor 
productivity does, it has the advantage of simplicity. It cannot be affected by errors of estimating the capital 
stock. Moreover, capital intensity is captured partly by industry dummies. 
19  The  variable  of  employed  persons  does  not  reflect  full-time  equivalents  as  information  of  part-time 
employees is not provided in the data. 
20 Summary statistics for these two variables without dropping the extremely different cases are presented in 
the appendix (Table A1). For example, for the first percentile, a labor productivity of -110,362 EUR and a return 
on sales of -155 percent are reported for 2007. At the other tail of the distribution, it is a productivity of 1.34 
million EUR per person, and a return on sales of 157 percent. Reasons for these outliers can be reporting 
errors, idiosyncratic events or an exceptionally different behavior, but none of this should distort results for the 
vast majority of enterprises (Wagner 2011: 10f.). Confidentiality of the data prohibits the identification of single 
cases and allows only for treating outlier issues in an accumulated way. This procedure appears appropriate if 
one looks at the premium regressions including outliers in Table A2, where almost all statistical significances 
are covered by a relatively small group of observations. 14 
 
they  were  obliged  to  answer  only  an  abbreviated  questionnaire  and  therefore  provided 
insufficient information. The final sample, however, contains N = 33,922 enterprises for 2007 
and N = 41,292 for 2008. Observations can be divided into subpopulations of domestically-
owned units which are independent (22,059 ≙ 65.03% for 2007 and 28,608 ≙ 69.28% for 
2008), which are part of a multi-establishment enterprise (9,030 ≙ 26.62% for 2007 and 
9,594 ≙ 23.24% for 2008) or which are headquarters of a multi-establishment enterprise 
(1,280 ≙ 3.77% for 2007 and 1350 ≙ 3.27% for 2008). Finally, there are enterprises under 
foreign control (1,553 ≙ 4.58% for 2007 and 1,740 ≙ 4.21% for 2008). 
 
[Table 2 about here] 
 
5.   Empirical analysis of foreign-owned enterprise´s relative performance 
5.1   Unconditional perspective 
Numerous German and international studies report superior average performance measures 
in favor of foreign-owned firms compared to the entire population of domestically-owned 
ones. On one hand, foreign-owned firms tend to be larger, more productive, and have higher 
personnel expenses. On the other hand, foreign-owned firms produce more capital-intensive 
and  with  a  pronounced  demand  for  relatively  high-skilled  labor.  Apart  from  a  simple 
comparison of means, much of this comparison draws upon analyses in which the reference 
group is composed of all units that can be labeled “domestically-owned”. But since the oft-
cited study of Doms and Jensen (1998), it seems obvious that this cannot be the adequate 
group of comparison. Foreign-owned firms in a given economy, or dependent units which 
are linked via cross-border networks with headquarters abroad, should be compared with 
dependent units which belong to a cross-border network and have their headquarters in the 
domestic economy. However, to the best of the author´s knowledge, such a comparison 
does not exist to date. In their frequently-cited work, Doms and Jensen (1998) proposed an 
idea for their US dataset which has since become common practice if allowed by the data - 
the domestic group of comparison should be restricted to units being part of a multinational 
network, whether parents or affiliates. 
 
While their strategy appears plausible at first glance, especially under the assumption of 
firm-specific  competitive  advantages  as  public  goods,  one  may  still  raise  concerns  since 15 
 
headquarters  are  compared  to  affiliates  here.  The  data  at  hand  allows  distinguishing 
dependent from independent from headquarter enterprises, as it was shown in the previous 
section. To achieve the best possible comparison group given the restrictions of the data, 
this study defines domestically-controlled dependent affiliates as a reference for foreign-
owned  affiliates,  as  there  is  no  information  about  the  multinational  status  in  the  data. 
Although this grouping is not an ideal solution, it contributes a new, interesting variation to 
other operationalizations. To counter this perceived deficit, another group of domestically-
controlled  enterprises  is  generated,  consisting  of  those  affiliates  with  noticeable 
international trade activities as can be assumed for MNE affiliates, which in this case is 
measured  by  an  export  quota  of  at  least  thirty  percent.  This  treatment  is  in  line  with 
previous studies like Borrmann et al. (2003) but should not conceal its tentative character, 
though.  Furthermore,  a  third  group  is  created,  composed  of  all  domestically-owned 
exporters. Thereby, the well-established findings of a superior performance of exporters, 
irrespective  of  their  ownership  status,  are  taken  into  account  (see  Wagner  2007  for  a 
survey). 
  In line with previous evidence, the foreign-controlled enterprises in this dataset seem 
to employ on average around 138 more persons in both years, have an average productivity 
advantage of 12,407 EUR in 2007 and of 23,059 EUR in 2008 (per person and per year). They 
paid a 22,047 EUR higher average annual wage in 2007 and still 19,435 EUR in 2008, and 
have a considerable higher export quota of 9.75 and 12.13 percentage points compared to 
domestically-owned  affiliates.  Interestingly,  only  profitability  appears  not  advantageous 
since  the  return  on  sales  is  on  average  8.08  and  3.71  percentage  points  lower  for  the 
foreign-owned group (results are shown in Table 3). All differences are statistically different 
from zero at a high level of α < 0.01 or 0.05. Compared to domestically-owned exporters, 
significant differences between the two groups hold, even though they shrink. Productivity is 
an exception, because differences even more than double in 2007. If the domestic group 
with  at  least  thirty  percent  of  international  sales  serves  as  reference,  the  productivity 
differential turns insignificant while the average size premium increases. 
 
[Table 3 about here] 
 16 
 
Coping  with  micro  data  reveals  considerable  heterogeneity  among  statistical  units.  This 
observation is not surprising but necessitates a treatment beyond analyzing mean values 
(see Wagner 2011 on this at length). In this sense, differences at common percentiles are 
described  in  Table  4.  Although  the  distributions  echo  the  picture  drawn  from  mean 
comparisons, they also illustrate heterogeneity concerns. For example, in 2007 regarding the 
90
th  percentile  of  all  domestically-owned  enterprises  and  the  10
th  percentile  of  the 
domestically-owned exporters exhibited a productivity advantage in favor of the domestic 
enterprises.  Additionally,  the  Kolmogorov-Smirnov  test  was  applied  to  test  whether  one 
empirical distribution function stochastically dominates another (H0: F(x) = G(x)) (Conover 
1999: 456ff.). The p-values reported in Table 4 support rejection of the null hypothesis at a 
highly-significant level in most cases. Therefore, there is not only a difference in means but 
also a first order stochastic dominance across the empirical distribution functions for the 
considered measures. The sole exception is the productivity comparison with domestically-
owned enterprises that gain at least thirty percent of their sales abroad. 
 
[Table 4 about here] 
 
5.2   Conditional perspective 
While unconditional comparisons contrast mean values of descriptive statistics, a conditional 
approach can be seen as a step forward to identify “fundamental differences” (Bellak 2004: 
484), or to detect the reasons thereof. Although unconditional results surely possess policy 
relevance too, evidence from conditional analysis should be of higher importance. 
  As it became clear in the previous section, foreign-owned enterprises are larger on 
average and might be located more likely in certain sectors, for instance with above-average 
capital  intensity.  Davies  and  Lyons  (1991)  demonstrate  in  an  early  decomposition  of 
productivity differences with UK data that nearly half of the differential is due to a structural 
effect determined by the fact that firms in consideration were located in highly-productive 
sectors. Thus, in line with earlier empirical work, structural and size effects will be controlled 
for in subsequent regressions. The estimated models were kept fairly simple
21 and can be 
written as follows: 
                                                           
21 The estimated models do not claim to be “explanation models” since their purpose is to show only statistical 
differences. These so-called premium regressions were previously applied in several studies like e.g., Bernard et 17 
 
(ln)Yi = β0 + β1 foi + β2 industryi + εi                                                      (1) 
(ln)Yi = β0 + β1 foi + β2 industryi + β3 sizei + β4 sizei
2 + εi                    (2) 
 
The endogenous variable Y refers to the various performance measures introduced above 
and is logarithmized whenever possible,
22 while fo denotes a dummy variable that takes the 
value 1 if the enterprise is under foreign control and 0 otherwise. Model 1 only includes a set 
of two-digit industry dummies whereas in model 2 the number of persons employed was 
added  in  absolute  and  squared  terms  to  account  for  non-linear  effects.  Besides  the 
establishment subscript i and the error term ε, β represents the particular parameter to be 
estimated,  including  β1  that  expresses  the  difference  between  foreign-owned 
establishments and the chosen reference group of the domestic population. 
  Most performance variables were estimated by using the robust OLS technique and 
are  reported  in  Table  5.
23  The  coefficients  of  Model  1  show  that  a  foreign  ownership 
premium persists after accounting for industry structure. Foreign-controlled enterprises are 
on average more than fifty percent larger than their dependent domestic counterparts and 
even up to 84 percent than those with a relatively high export quota, ceteris paribus.
24  
Model 2 lends more meaningful descriptions of the data due to its inclusion of firm 
size.  First,  size  has  a  statistically-significant  negative  effect  on  productivity  since  β3  is 
negative.  This  finding  directly  contradicts  evidence  from  the  manufacturing  sector  but 
largely the case in the service sector. One possible explanation addresses differences in 
compensating the labor factor (see Vogel 2011: 27 for a similar argument). The squared term 
is positive and statistically significant but very small, therefore the maximum of a u-shaped 
function  lies  far  outside  the  actually  observed  size  range  and  can  be  neglected  for 
interpretation  (size  covariates  for  all  estimations  are  reported  in  Table  A3).  For  labor 
productivity, results show a foreign ownership premium of more than 32,000 EUR in 2007 
and  2008  on  average  and  other  things  being  equal.  This  is  much  higher  than  the 
unconditional mean premium. Nonetheless, the coefficient turns insignificant if the group of 
comparison consists of domestic enterprises with a high export ratio. Gross wages are also 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
al. (2007). Therefore, measures of model fitting are of secondary interest and are not reported in the following 
tables. R
2-levels from productivity and profitability estimations of model 2 range between 6 and 10 percent. 
When enterprises are separated by country of origin, R
2-levels are fairly similar. 
22 Only the variables of persons employed and wages can actually be considered here. 
23 All estimations were executed with Stata 11. 
24  Values  are  obtained  via  exponential  transformation  100*(exp(β1)-1)  from  estimations  of  log(persons 
employed). 18 
 
higher by 67 and 63 percent in foreign-owned enterprises compared to domestically-owned 
affiliates, by 31 and 26 percent compared to domestic exporters, and by 25 and 16 percent 
in comparison to domestic exporters with high export intensity. As mentioned above, the 
lack of information about the quality of labor prevents conclusive statements on the paid 
factor price. In contrast to the above results, return on sales turns out to be significantly less 
in foreign-controlled entities by approximately around five or six percentage points for 2007, 
irrespective of the reference group. In the 2008 data, this gap decreases by more than three 
percentage  points.  Compared  to  domestic  exporters,  there  is  no  significant  difference. 
Compared to those with at least thirty percent sales abroad, the difference is even more 
than four percentage points. 
  Table 5 displays the results of Probit estimations of export participation. Coefficients 
indicate a higher probability for foreign-owned enterprises to be exporters, but can only be 
interpreted quantitatively with the help of marginal effects, which are given as well; the 
probability  of  a  foreign-owned  enterprise  to  engage  in  exporting,  thus,  lies  14  and  23 
percent above that of domestic ones from the same sector and of the same size in 2007 and 
2008,  respectively.  Superior  export  positions  can  also  be  seen  for  sales  generated 
internationally, namely about eight and eleven percentage points more on average, ceteris 
paribus.  To  achieve  this  result,  the  export  quota  was  estimated  in  the  framework  of  a 
generalized linear model with a Logit link function because observations are cumulated at 
the  lower  bound  of  the  endogenous  variable  due  to  a  disproportionately  number  of 
enterprises  without  export  behavior  at  all.  Such  fractional  response  variables  demand a 
particular estimation technique as described by Ramalho et al. (2011). Because the reported 
coefficients  cannot  be  interpreted  in  a  straightforward  way,  simulations  of  hypothetical 
enterprises were executed (Table 6). The simulated export intensities also advocate for the 
assumption of a decreasing difference with increasing firm size. 
 
[Table 5 about here] 
[Table 6 about here] 
 
Although  conditional  evidence  was  found  in  various  regressions  thus  far,  the  analysis 
remains  tied  to  mean  values.  Conditional  quantile  regression  seems  to  be  the  proper 
approach  to  surmount  this  deficit  and  extract  more  information  from  the  dataset.  The 19 
 
method  enables  an  interpretation  of  the  particular  effects  at  certain  percentiles,  even 
though  interpretation  is  not  free  of  obstacles.  Quantile  regression  was  introduced  by 
Koenker  and  Bassett  (1978)  and  has  recently  been  applied  more  frequently  to  face 
challenges of coping with micro data (e.g., Dimelis and Louri 2002, Barbosa and Louri 2005 
and Grasseni 2010). Estimations of size, labor productivity, return on sales and gross wages 
were performed for all deciles here, with variation of reference groups, and are shown in 
Tables 7, 8 and 9.
25 First and foremost, the overarching rejection of the null hypothesis, 
which states that coefficients are equal across quantiles (f-test), leads to the confirmation of 
the applicability of this method. The only cases where this hypothesis cannot be rejected in 
both years are profitability estimates versus German enterprises with high export quota. For 
2008 data this applies to profitability estimates versus all German exporting affiliates and 
productivity  estimates  with  export  intensive  German  enterprises  as  well.  Turning  to 
individual coefficients, one sees that relatively few enterprises drive the productivity mean 
premium of previous regressions as it is only surpassed from the 80
th percentile.
26 Return on 
sales offers more variety in terms of sign and significance. Here, the premium is insignificant 
at the upper range of enterprises in every specification and sometimes this is the case for 
even more than half of the observations. Additionally, differentials turn positive at upper 
deciles in comparison with all German affiliates as well as exporters thereof in 2007 but only 
for  estimates  with  all  German  exporters  in  2008.
27  However,  these  coefficients  are  not 
statistically significant at any conventional level. Moreover, it reveals that the much higher 
profitability  differentials  for  2007  data  compared  to  2008,  stem  from  considerable 
differences at the lower bound as the reported coefficients at the 10
th percentile tend to be 
a  multiple  of  the  one  at  the  20
th  in  every  specification.  Furthermore,  the  positive  size 
premium can only not be expected for affiliates below the 4
th decile in the 2007 comparison 
with German exporters. 
 
[Table 7 about here] 
[Table 8 about here] 
[Table 9 about here] 
                                                           
25 Standard errors were obtained via bootstrapping resampling with 50 replications. 
26 Note that results regarding labor productivity with 2007 data are only available for model 1 due to a lack of 
convergence, thus coefficients are not conditioned on firm size. 
27 Again, for 2007 model 2 could not be estimated successfully in the comparison with domestic exporters (cf. 
previous fn.). 20 
 
In summary, a conditional analysis of mean values indicates that performance differences 
remain  after  addressing  effects  of  industry  structure  and  size  if  the  German  group  of 
comparison includes all dependent enterprises. If the makeshift indicator of multinational 
network participation is used to restrict the comparison to domestic enterprises with an 
export quota of at least thirty percent, differences in labor productivity lose their statistical 
significance.  However,  performance  differentials  of  foreign-controlled  enterprises  can  be 
distinguished from a mere export premium since they persist when the reference group is 
limited to German exporters although differences decrease (except wages). By extending the 
analysis  to  account  for  conditional  effects  using  quantiles,  one  uncovers  considerable 
heterogeneity across the distribution of enterprises. The quantile analysis provides essential 
insight, especially regarding profitability, but predominantly supports other results. 
 
5.3   Differences by origin of control 
To evaluate whether there are performance differences among enterprises whose control 
originates from different countries, or rather from institutional units located in differing 
economic frameworks, three categories of origin were created: affiliates with a parent in the 
US, in European countries,
28 or in other nations. The pattern of origin looks very similar to 
that of inward FDI in general (Deutsche Bundesbank 2010), namely the vast majority of 
enterprises are controlled from other European states (71%) and, among all other nations, 
the US is the most important source of investments (22%) (Table 10). Therefore, it seems of 
interest that several international studies find a productivity premium which can be assigned 
exclusively to US firms (see Criscuolo and Martin 2009) although evidence is based mainly on 
manufacturing data. Such a clear-cut US advantage does not seem to apply generally to 
foreign-owned  enterprises  in  the  German  service  sector.  This  is  because  coefficients, 
conditional on firm size and industry, are not significantly different from each other on any 
conventional error level for 2007. For 2008, a clear picture is missing as well. Even though 
coefficients for US and European enterprises differ significantly, those of the US and the 
category “others” do not and also a difference between European and other cannot be 
stated (see Table 11). Regardless, the quantitative premium for US and other affiliates is 
much the same (around 46,000 EUR versus domestic units) in the 2007 data, while European 
                                                           
28 “European countries” refers to members of the European Economic Area and Switzerland, excluding special 
and overseas territories. 21 
 
enterprises gain an average premium of only slightly more than half of that value. Compared 
to the domestic group with striking export activities, there remains a significant premium of 
about 27,000 EUR only for US affiliates with an error probability of some six percent. The 
2008 data reveals a somewhat more exposed role of US affiliates since coefficients stay 
highly significant across all comparison groups and are higher than the other two groups of 
foreign-controlled affiliates by between 20,000 and 30,000 EUR. Regarding profitability, the 
performance  gap  seems  clearly  to  the  disadvantage  of  foreign-controlled  affiliates, 
irrespective of origin, since it persists throughout almost all variations of the domestic group 
in both years, except in the comparison with domestic exporters in 2008. Quantitatively 
speaking, the return on sales on average ceteris paribus is roughly between two and seven 
percentage points lower for foreign-controlled affiliates. 
In the 2007 data, European affiliates display different bahavior when export behavior 
and wages are taken into consideration: While all foreign-owned enterprises pay notably 
higher  per  capita  wages  on  average  compared  to  their  German  counterparts,  European 
entities appear to pay up to 50 percent less than US and other affiliates. The likelihood of 
engaging in exports is twelve percent higher for European firms but only seven and twelve 
percentage points lower compared to US and other affiliates, respectively. The same pattern 
shows up for the magnitude of exports as can be seen from simulations in Table 6. These 
differences hold only regarding wages and export intensity, when the 2008 cross-section is 
taken into consideration. 
 
[Table 10 about here] 
[Table 11 about here] 
 
5.4   Exporter premium among foreign-controlled enterprises 
Foreign-controlled firms generally export more often and a higher share of their output. 
When these firms are compared to domestic ones with a pronounced export activity, most 
performance differences turn insignificant. According to these results, the question arises 
whether the feature of exporting is a more reliable indicator for superior performance than 
foreign ownership. For generating a rather differentiated picture of the relevant attributes 
and to generally investigate the export behavior of foreign-controlled affiliates a comparison 
of exporters and non-exporters within this population seems of interest. Empirical studies of 22 
 
an  exporter  performance  premium  that  explicitly  distinguish  between  domestically-  and 
foreign-owned firms are rare. An example using Chinese data is Lu et al. (2010), who find 
foreign-owned
29  exporters  to  be  less  productive  than  foreign-owned  non-exporters.  This 
negative exporter productivity premium, in a way, contradicts other findings that generally 
attest a superior performance in favor of exporters (Wagner 2007). At a first glance, there 
are performance disadvantages for foreign-controlled exporters in German services, too, 
when compared to foreign-owned non-exporters. In the simple mean comparison, foreign 
exporters suffer a productivity disadvantage of -22,600 EUR in 2007 and -12,000 EUR in 2008 
and also a profitability drawback of -3.53 percentage points in 2007 and -2.15 percentage 
points in 2008 (Table 12). Possible explanations could refer to different business strategies 
within the foreign-owned group, such as using affiliates as export platforms (Ekholm et al. 
2007) or other asset sourcing strategies. However, when industry and size is controlled for, 
coefficients are far from being statistically significant on conventional levels (Table 13). The 
performance  similarity  may  be  due  to  much  lower  fixed  costs  of  exporting  for  foreign-
controlled  firms  than  for  domestically-controlled  counterparts  because  the  former  join 
cross-border  ties  by  definition  and  may  be  endowed  inevitably  with  knowledge  about 
foreign markets. Therefore, the self-selection of advantageous firms into exporting (e.g., 
Melitz 2003) could play a minor role within the population of foreign-owned firms. Finally, 
since  differences  between  exporters  and  non-exporters  within  the  group  of  foreign-
controlled enterprises are ceteris paribus far from being obvious even if only a minimum of 
covariates  is  applied,  exporting  seems  to  be  a  relatively  weak  indicator  for  average 
performance advantages of foreign-owned enterprises in the German services. 
 
 [Table 12 about here] 







                                                           
29 They use a threshold of 25% for the definition of foreign ownership. 23 
 
6.   Concluding remarks 
In times of an ever-increasing economic weight of MNE affiliates and the associated cross-
border linkages of economic activity around the globe, demand for a robust basement of 
stylized facts should be satisfied to draw policy decisions upon it. A neat example form 
assumptions of externalities from the presence of foreign-owned firms that should be based 
on  comprehensive  knowledge  about  performance  differences  between  those  and  the 
domestically-owned firms of a considered economy. 
  This study demonstrated that a causal impact channel of foreign ownership per se 
appears possible from a theoretical point of view. This provides a powerful justification for 
the general investigation of the foreignness feature of foreign-owned firms and is neglected 
in  most  previous  studies.  Other  effects  that  can  be  captured  by  a  dichotomous  foreign 
ownership variable and are not intrinsically due to foreignness were discussed as well. 
To  counter  to  the  lack  of  knowledge  about  foreign-controlled  enterprises  in  the 
German  service  sector,  their  relative  performance  was  examined  by  comparing 
unconditioned and conditioned means as well as distributions along quantiles to allow for 
heterogeneity across individual enities. For this study, a newly available database within the 
framework  of  official  statistics  was  used,  and,  for  example,  allowed  for  generating  a 
reference  group  of  domestic  dependent  affiliates.  Results  show  that  foreign-controlled 
enterprises  in  the  German  service  sector  were  characterized  by  fifty  percent  more 
employees, 67 and 63 percent higher wage payments, and a lower return on sales by around 
2 to 6 percentage points compared to domestic affiliates on average and ceteris paribus. 
Foreign-controlled firms had a 14 and 23 percent higher probability to engage in exporting 
coupled with a superior export intensity of some 8 and 11 percentage points in 2007 and 
2008. Most of the performance differences persisted when foreign-owned enterprises were 
compared to domestically-controlled exporters and domestically-owned exporters with at 
least thirty percent of sales abroad, although they tended to shrink. Labor productivity is an 
important  exception  where  differences  became  insignificant  in  comparison  with  the 
domestic  group  characterized  by  a  high  degree  of  internationalization.  These  findings 
seemed generally consistent with previous research and support evidence that other factors 
like multinationality may be more important factors for explaining a superior performance of 
foreign-owned  firms  than  foreignness  itself.  Moreover,  results  of  quantile  regressions 
weaken a universal assumption of performance gaps among foreign-owned affiliates. From a 24 
 
policy  perspective,  both  conclusions  implicate  that  a  general  and  uniform  treatment  of 
foreign-owned firms should be regarded with caution as it might be inappropriate. Further 
important insights are the distinct placement of European enterprises among all others in 
respect of export behavior and wage payments and that a certain US productivity advantage, 
as it is reported in many studies for the manufacturing sector, does not seem to exist in the 
German service sector.  
 
Although the cross-sectional data and the “non-explanatory” premium regression models 
suffer from numerous limitations regarding their explanatory power and demand for future 
research,  this  study  provides  an  important  step  to  understanding  the  role  of  foreign-
controlled affiliates in German services in presenting the first comprehensive econometric 
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Figure 1: Foreign-owned enterprises in German non-financial sectors 
 
 





















Number Employees Sales Value added
Total non-financial sector business services and other (K) Manufacturing (D)32 
 
Table 1: Potential channels affecting the performance of foreign-controlled affiliates 
Effect  Examples  Relevant factor  Expected impact on productivity 
(Genuine) specific advantage of MNE  Superior technology or organizational 
advantages 
Multinationality  + 





Specific role of affiliate  Asset sourcing strategies and export 
platforms 
Business strategy of group head  -/+ 
Country of origin  Factor endowments, specific business 
systems and other cultural differences 
Nationality  -/+ 
(Liability of) foreignness  Additional costs for market entry and 
communication 
Foreign control  - 
 
Note: This table is for illustrative purposes only and does not claim to be enumerative. The separation of effects is not that clear-cut as may be suggested, as, for example the liability of 
foreignness and also network effects can be already captured by the specific advantage hypothesis. This table shows only the expected impact on overall productivity and it has to be kept in 














Table 2: Summary statistics 
Y  year  mean  std.dev.  p1  p10  p25  p50  p75  p90  p99 
Employees  2007  67.18  497.01  1  3  6  12  32  107  925 
2008  68.01  447.61  2  4  7  15  37  118  874 
Labor productivity
ac  2007  87929.04  130854  -6973  15672.39  30156.7  51287.65  88280.5  178367.5  716995.6 
2008  77249.72  97008.06  4612.95  17878.36  31987.6  51662.89  82285.04  146027.4  538350 
Return on sales
c  2007  23.8  27.89  -45  -2.14  5.11  18.02  40.37  62.73  95.36 
2008  27.51  25.86  -26.29  0.42  7.84  22.82  44.49  64.06  93.27 
Wage per capita
a  2007  31276.3  34353.6  1920  7342.71  13863.33  24428.32  39712.4  57657  148000 
2008  28369.74  25569.4  1490.21  7335.88  13362.28  22802.89  37173.25  53627.32  109678.8 
Export quota
b  2007  3.23  12.79  0  0  0  0  0  4.49  78.86 
2008  4.13  13.86  0  0  0  0  0.02  9.86  82.16 
Log(employees)  2007  2.7  1.42  0  1.1  1.79  2.49  3.47  4.67  6.83 
2008  2.9  1.34  0.69  1.39  1.95  2.71  3.61  4.77  6.77 
Log(wage per capita)  2007  10.01  0.86  7.56  8.9  9.54  10.1  10.59  10.96  11.91 
2008  9.95  0.86  7.31  8.9  9.5  10.03  10.52  10.89  11.61 
 
N: 33922(2007); 41292(2008). 
Note: 
a In EUR per year; 
b In shares of sales abroad (percent); 
c Upper and lower 1 percent are excluded; 













Table 3: Unconditional means by enterprise groups 
Y  Foreign controlled affiliates 
 
(N: 1553(2007); 1740(2008)) 
Domestically controlled affiliates 
All affiliates  Exporter  Export quota ≥ 30 % 
2007 (N: 9030)  2008 (N:9594)  2007 (N: 1431)  2008 (N: 2369)  2007 (N: 277)  2008 (N: 387) 






  116.12** 
(445.98) 
  53.54*** 
(94.71) 
 







  114.77*** 
(405.53) 
  118.77*** 
(544.33) 
  78,26*** 
(163,09) 
t-test (p-value)    0.0009    0.0017    0.0000 






  99042.62*** 
(166214.1) 
  111799.7 
(154807.4) 
 
t-test (p-value)  0.0368    0.0000    0.1355   




  88613.61*** 
(117351.6) 
  84067.13*** 
(86419.24) 
  105188 
(102495.2) 
t-test (p-value)    0.0000    0.0000    0.2816 






  14.7*** 
(27.54) 
  15.99** 
(35.33) 
 
t-test (p-value)  0.0000    0.0008    0.0197   




  20.65*** 
(24.73) 
  16.88 
(20.68) 
  20.78 
(23.72) 
t-test (p-value)    0.0000    0.9355    0.0041*** 






  44209.52*** 
(34560.47) 
  47314.47*** 
(34412.32) 
 
  t-test (p-value)  0.0000    0.0000    0.0000   




  33404.1*** 
(28466.03) 
  40779.54*** 
(23583.66) 
  45114.18*** 
(26986) 
t-test (p-value)    0.0000    0.0000    0.0000 






  17.16*** 
(24.71) 
  60.69*** 
(23.95) 
 
  t-test (p-value)  0.0000    0.0000    0.0000   




  3.76*** 
(12.81) 
  15.21 
(22.12) 
  57.97*** 
(22.85) 
t-test (p-value)    0.0000    0.3895    0.0000 
 





Table 4: Quantiles and Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests 
Y  year  group  p10  p25  p50  p75  p90  K-S-test (p-values) 
                H0: equal  H0: fof>  H0: fof< 
Employees  2007  foaff  4  11  35  112  307       
    doaff  3  6  17  57  193  0.000  1.000  0.000 
    doaffex  5  11  29  80  203  0.000  0.142  0.000 
    doaffex30  3  7  22  58  136  0.000  0.976  0.000 
  2008  foaff  7  17  46  132  360       
    doaff  5  10  26  82  241  0.000  1.000  0.000 
    doaffex  7  14  32  81  203  0.000  0.904  0.000 
    doaffex30  6  12  31  81  169  0.000  0.998  0.000 
Labor productivity  2007  foaff  20863.05  45976.1  77324.06  124787.3  242858       
    doaff  13331.15  29047.91  56123.07  107500.3  251156.7  0.000  0.568  0.000 
    doaffex  26381.97  42209.88  63091.5  96468.5  161529  0.000  0.038  0.000 
    doaffex30  26902.63  47018.68  67470.2  115173.1  231404  0.143  0.391  0.072 
  2008  foaff  25851.93  48496.11  77254.2  124230.9  210702.2       
    doaff  15316.28  30046.77  54809.31  93108.34  185420.5  0.000  0.984  0.000 
    doaffex  25598.61  42324.41  63813.05  94080.16  146098.6  0.000  0.995  0.000 
    doaffex30  33295.4  48344.64  77958.57  114942.5  203033.7  0.344  0.173  0.387 
Return on sales  2007  foaff  -23.44  0.36  9.71  26.95  51.79       
    doaff  -5.47  2.89  12.12  32.36  62.31  0.000  0.000  0.999 
    doaffex  -3.61  3.67  10.78  23.25  43.58  0.000  0.000  0.025 
    doaffex30  -10.09  3.58  13.68  29.63  54.19  0.015  0.007  0.943 
  2008  foaff  -4.86  2.79  11.44  27.37  48.87       
    doaff  -1.16  4.27  13.99  32.08  56.45  0.000  0.000  0.981 
    doaffex  -1.48  4.32  12.22  25.46  45.39  0.004  0.002  0.237 
    doaffex30  -2.77  5.86  16.09  32.8  54.28  0.001  0.000  0.938 
Wage per capita  2007  foaff  19613.29  33347.5  49417.35  69001.77  98628.91       
    doaff  9315.33  17406.17  30472.36  44944  63285.3  0.000  0.999  0.000 
    doaffex  17740.4  26668.64  38738.57  53266.36  70479.41  0.000  0.993  0.000 
    doaffex30  18158.3  27841.7  40330.45  56666.67  76471.45  0.000  0.987  0.000 
  2008  foaff  18532.05  32049.32  46847  64630.42  85665.78       
    doaff  9018.03  16935.32  29256.61  42906.48  59079.25  0.000  0.994  0.000 
    doaffex  16364.59  25662.19  37629  50636.38  67598.5  0.000  0.989  0.000 
    doaffex30  18519  28589.05  40130.95  55970.77  73215.54  0.000  0.969  0.000 
Export quota  2007  foaff  0  0  0  8.88  52.92       
    doaff  0  0  0  0  2.98  0.000  1.000  0.000 
    doaffex  0.31  1.28  6.49  20.77  51.91  0.000  0.000  0.803 
    doaffex30  33.43  39.88  54.25  80.37  100  0.000  0.000  1.000 
  2008  foaff  0  0  0.12  21.07  60.61       
    doaff  0  0  0  0  9.03  0.000  1.000  0.000 
    doaffex  0.31  1.34  5.81  19.04  45.11  0.000  0.000  0.019 
    doaffex30  33.07  38.96  50.77  73.41  100  0.000  0.000  1.000 
 
N: see tab. 2. 




Table 5: Regression estimates 
Variable (Y)  Year  Reference group of domestic affiliates 
    All affiliates  Exporter  Export quota ≥ 30 % 
    (estimates with N = 10583(2007); 11334(2008))  (estimates with N = 2984(2007); 4109(2008))  (estimates with N = 1830(2007); 2127(2008)) 
    (1)  (2)  (1)  (2)  (1)  (2) 
Employees
































































































































































































































Note: Reported are coefficients with p-values in brackets; Model 1 includes 2-digit industry dummies, model 2 controls for size additionally; 
a OLS estimator; 
b Glm estimator; 
c Probit estimation; Significance at the 10% (*), 5% 




Table 6: Simulations of export intensity for hypothetical enterprises 
year  group  model 1  model 2 (number of employees) 
      10  100  500  1000 
2007  Foreign controlled affiliates  0.11  0.11  0.11  0.07  0.08 
  All domestically controlled affiliates  0.03  0.03  0.03  0.03  0.02 
  Domestically controlled exporter  0.13  0.16  0.16  0.14  0.12 
  Domestically controlled exporter with  
quota ≥ 30 % 
0.45  0.58  0.57  0.54  0.5 
             
  Origin of control:                                         US      0.04     
  Europe      0.02     
  other      0.06     
2008  Foreign controlled affiliates  0.15  0.16  0.16  0.13  0.11 
  All domestically controlled affiliates  0.04  0.04  0.04  0.03  0.03 
  Domestically controlled exporter  0.15  0.1  0.1  0.08  0.07 
  Domestically controlled exporter with  
quota ≥ 30 % 
0.57  0.4  0.39  0.34  0.27 
             
  Origin of control:                                         US      0.05     
  Europe      0.04     












Table 7: Quantile regression estimates with reference group: domestically owned affiliates 

















































































































































































































































































































































































































N: 10583(2007); 11334(2008). 
Note: Reported are coefficients with p-values in brackets; Model 1 includes 2-digit industry dummies, model 2 controls for size additionally; F-test null hypothesis: coefficients are equal across quantiles; Standard errors obtained using 
bootstrapping method with 50 replications; Significance at the 10% (*), 5% (**) and 1% (***) level. 
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Table 8: Quantile regression estimates with reference group: domestically owned exporter 









































































































































































































































































































































































N: 2984(2007); 4109(2008). 
Note: Reported are coefficients with p-values in brackets; Model 1 includes 2-digit industry dummies, model 2 controls for size additionally; F-test null hypothesis: coefficients are equal across quantiles; 
Standard errors obtained using bootstrapping method with 50 replications; Significance at the 10% (*), 5% (**) and 1% (***) level. 
 40 
 
Table 9: Quantile regression estimates with reference group: domestically owned exporter with export quota ≥ 30% 









































































































































































































































































































































































N: 1830(2007); 2127(2008). 
Note: Reported are coefficients with p-values in brackets; Model 1 includes 2-digit industry dummies, model 2 controls for size additionally; F-test null hypothesis: coefficients are equal across quantiles; 
Standard errors obtained using bootstrapping method with 50 replications; Significance at the 10% (*), 5% (**) and 1% (***) level. 
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Table 10: Unconditional means by country of origin 
Y  Foreign controlled 
enterprises by 
country of origin 






T-test (p-values) by domestically controlled comparison groups 
All affiliates  Exporter  Export quota ≥ 30 % 
2007  2008  2007  2008  2007  2008 


























0.2983  0.3494  0.5549  0.4338  0.0333**  0.0501* 






0.1448  0.0000***  0.0058***  0.0000***  0.1701  0.0035*** 






0.1638  0.0000***  0.0006***  0.0000***  0.1843  0.8271 






0.2126  0.0308**  0.0314**  0.0099***  0.2007  0.6386 






0.0000***  0.0002***  0.0292**  0.3813  0.0409**  0.0040*** 






0.0000***  0.0000***  0.0134**  0.5054  0.0450**  0.0160** 






0.0029***  0.0065***  0.0918*  0.4256  0.0759*  0.0163** 






0.0000***  0.0000***  0.0000***  0.0000***  0.0000***  0.0000*** 






0.0000***  0.0000***  0.0000***  0.0000***  0.0104**  0.0520* 






0.0000***  0.0000***  0.0000***  0.0000***  0.0002***  0.0009*** 






0.0000***  0.0000***  0.7310  0.0199**  0.0000***  0.0000*** 






0.0000***  0.0000***  0.0000***  0.2518  0.0000***  0.0000*** 






0.0000***  0.0000***  0.0488***  0.0205**  0.0000***  0.0000*** 
 
N: US 337(2007), 365(2008); Europe 1059(2007), 1159(2008); Other 104(2007), 130(2008). 





Table 11: Regression estimates by country of origin and reference group 
Variable (Y)  year  reference group  model  Country of origin    F-/Chi2-tests (H0) 
      US  Europe  Other    us = eur  us = other  eur = other 
Employees


































































































































































































































































































  2008  doaff  (1)  -3.47***  -2.33***  -3.5*         43 
 
(0.008)  (0.001)  (0.068)  (0.4316)  (0.9925)  (0.5637) 














































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































N: 2007: Reference group. doaff = 10507; Reference group doaffex = 2934; Reference group doaffex30 = 1780; 2008: Reference group. doaff = 12600; Reference group doaffex = 4023; Reference group doaffex30 = 2041. 
Note: Abbreviation foaff for foreign owned affiliates, doaff for domestically owned affiliates, doaffex for exporters and doaffex30 for exporters with export quota of at least 30 percent; Reported are coefficients with p-values in brackets; Model 1 
includes 2-digit industry dummies, model 2 controls for size additionally; 
a OLS estimator; 
b Glm estimator; 





Table 12: Unconditional mean comparison of foreign owned affiliates by export participation 
group  Year (N)    Employees  Labor productivity  Return on sales  Wage per capita 
foaffex  2007 (537)  mean  273,78  105644  11,34  59341,6 
    std. dev.  (1295,23)  (120749,8)  (24,43)  (40763,3) 
  2008 (895)  mean  207,23  105879,1  15,95  54982,11 
    std. dev.  (904,01)  (108650,6)  (22,42)  (35181,7) 
foaffnonex  2007 (953)  mean  228,4  128224,6  14,87  57656,35 
    std. dev.  (212189)  (173046,2)  (31,04)  (59682,37) 
  2008 (845)  mean  299,62  117809,6  18,1  50568,88 
    std. dev.  (2273,69)  (141124,2)  (25,33)  (42052,37) 
             
exporter premium   2007    45,38  -22580,6***  -3,53**  1685,25 
t-test (p-value)      0,6086  0,0032  0,0154  0,5192 
exporter premium   2008    -92,39  -11930,5**  -2,15*  4413,23** 
t-test (p-value)      0,2708  0,0493  0,0744  0,0180 
 
Note: foaffex stands for foreign controlled affiliates with export participation, foaffnonex for those without export activities. 
 
 
Table 13: Regression estimates for foreign owned affiliates by export participation 
Variable (Y)  year  employees  Labor productivity  Return on sales  Wage per capita 
    (1)  (2)  (1)  (2)  (1)  (2)  (1)  (2) 
Foaffex-dummy  2007  60,78  -  -9905,53  -8397,36  -1,77  -1,76  125,89  801,89 
  (0,506)  ()  (0,165)  (0,238)  (0,219)  (0,224)  (0,963)  (0,766) 
2008  -91,4  -  -4189,3  -4499,24  -1,24  -1,26  3232,23*  3114,02 
  (0,288)  ()  (0,459)  (0,425)  (0,285)  (0,277)  (0,089)  (0,100) 
 











Table A1: Summary statistics (including outliers) 
Y  year  mean  std.dev.  p1  p10  p25  p50  p75  p90  p99 
Labor productivity 
(in EUR per year) 
2007  145835.3  3736625  -110362  13925.47  29568.35  51493.89  90839.64  201898.1  1337295 
2008  129024  3336068  -17416  16428.81  31417.58  51813.19  84110.66  159095.1  1057550 
Return on sales  2007  -3890304  652000000  -154.95  -4.14  4.65  17.98  41.39  66.2  156.85 
2008  -2584851  470000000  -72.95  -0.67  7.32  22.78  45.44  66.81  127.76 
 
N: 35324(2007); 42996(2008). 
 
 
Table A2: Regression estimates (including outliers) 
Variable (Y)  Year  Reference group of domestic affiliates 
    All affiliates  Exporter  Export quota ≥ 30 % 
    (estimates with N = 10994(2007); 12114(2008))  (estimates with N = (2007); (2008))  (estimates with N = (2007); (2008)) 
    (1)  (2)  (1)  (2)  (1)  (2) 

























































Table A3: Regression estimates of firm size covariates (model 2) 
Variable (Y)  Year  Reference group of domestic affiliates 
    All affiliates  Exporter  Export quota ≥ 30 % 
    (estimates with N = 10583(2007); 11334(2008))  (estimates with N = 2984(2007); 4109(2008))  (estimates with N = 1830(2007); 2127(2008)) 
 
    Number of employees  (Number of employees)
2  Number of employees  (Number of employees)
2  Number of employees  (Number of employees)
2 
Labor productivity





























































































































Note: Reported are coefficients with p-values in brackets; 
a OLS estimator; 
b Glm estimator; 
c Probit estimation; Significance at the 10% (*), 5% (**) and 1% (***) level. 
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